Obama’s Dilemma: U.S. Foreign Policy and Electoral Realities | STRATFOR

By George Friedman

STRATFOR does not normally involve itself in domestic American politics. Our focus is on international affairs, and American politics, like politics everywhere, is a passionate business. The vilification from all sides that follows any mention we make of American politics is both inevitable and unpleasant. Nevertheless, it’s our job to chronicle the unfolding of the international system, and the fact that the United States is moving deeply into an election cycle will affect American international behavior and therefore the international system.

The United States remains the center of gravity of the international system. The sheer size of its economy (regardless of its growth rate) and the power of its military (regardless of its current problems) make the United States unique. Even more important, no single leader of the world is as significant, for good or bad, as the American president. That makes the American presidency, in its broadest sense, a matter that cannot be ignored in studying the international system.

The American system was designed to be a phased process. By separating the selection of the legislature from the selection of the president, the founders created a system that did not allow for sudden shifts in personnel. Unlike parliamentary systems, in which the legislature and the leadership are intimately linked, the institutional and temporal uncoupling of the system in the United States was intended to control the passing passions by leaving about two-thirds of the U.S. Senate unchanged even in a presidential election year, which always coincides with the election of the House of Representatives. Coupled with senatorial rules, this makes it difficult for the president to govern on domestic affairs. Changes in the ideological tenor of the system are years in coming, and when they come they stay a long time. Mostly, however, the system is in gridlock. Thomas Jefferson said that a government that governs least is the best. The United States has a vast government that rests on a system in which significant change is not impossible but which demands a level of consensus over a period of time that rarely exists.

This is particularly true in domestic politics, where the complexity is compounded by the uncertainty of the legislative branch. Consider that the healthcare legislation passed through major compromise is still in doubt, pending court rulings that thus far have been contradictory. All of this would have delighted the founders if not the constantly trapped presidents, who frequently shrug off their limits in the domestic arena in favor of action in the international realm, where their freedom to maneuver is much greater, as the founders intended.

The Burden of the Past

The point of this is that all U.S. presidents live within the framework in which Barack Obama is now operating. First, no president begins with a clean slate. All begin with the unfinished work of the prior administration. Thus, George W. Bush began his presidency with an al Qaeda whose planning and implementation for 9/11 was already well under way. Some of the al Qaeda operatives who would die in the attack were already in the country. So, like all of his predecessors, Obama assumed the presidency with his agenda already laid out.

Obama had a unique set of problems. The first was his agenda, which focused on ending the Iraq war and reversing social policies in place since Ronald Reagan became president in 1981. By the time Obama entered office, the process of withdrawal from Iraq was under way, which gave him the option of shifting the terminal date. The historic reversal that he wanted to execute, starting with healthcare reform, confronted the realities of September 2008 and the American financial crisis. His Iraq policy was in place by Inauguration Day while his social programs were colliding with the financial crisis.

Obama’s campaign was about more than particular policies. He ran on a platform that famously promised change and hope. His tremendous political achievement was in framing those concepts in such a way that they were interpreted by voters to mean precisely what they wanted them to mean without committing Obama to specific policies. To the anti-war faction it meant that the wars would end. To those concerned about unilateralism it meant that unilateralism would be replaced by multilateralism. To those worried about growing inequality it meant that he would end inequality. To those concerned about industrial jobs going overseas it meant that those jobs would stay in the United States. To those who hated Guantanamo it meant that Guantanamo would be closed.

Obama created a coalition whose expectations of what Obama would do were shaped by them and projected on Obama. In fact, Obama never quite said what his supporters thought he said. His supporters thought they heard that he was anti-war. He never said that. He simply said that he opposed Iraq and thought Afghanistan should be waged. His strategy was to allow his followers to believe what they wanted so long as they voted for him, and they obliged. Now, this is not unique to Obama. It is how presidents get elected. What was unique was how well he did it and the problems it caused once he became president.

It must first be remembered that, contrary to the excitement of the time and faulty memories today, Obama did not win an overwhelming victory. About 47 percent of the public voted for someone other than Obama. It was certainly a solid victory, but it was neither a landslide nor a mandate for his programs. But the excitement generated by his victory created the sense of victory that his numbers didn’t support.

Another problem was that he had no programmatic preparation for the reality he faced. September 2008 changed everything in the sense that it created financial and economic realities that ran counter to the policies he envisioned. He shaped those policies during the primaries and after the convention, and they were based on assumptions that were no longer true after September 2008. Indeed, it could be argued that he was elected because of September 2008. Prior to the meltdown, John McCain had a small lead over Obama, who took over the lead only after the meltdown. Given that the crisis emerged on the Republicans’ watch, this made perfect sense. But shifting policy priorities was hard because of political commitments and inertia and perhaps because the extremities of the crisis were not fully appreciated.

Obama’s economic policies did not differ wildly from Bush’s — indeed, many of the key figures had served in the Federal Reserve and elsewhere during the Bush administration. The Bush administration’s solution was to print and insert money into financial institutions in order to stabilize the system. By the time Obama came into power, it was clear to his team that the amount of inserted money was insufficient and had to be increased. In addition, in order to sustain the economy, the policy that had been in place during the Bush years of maintaining low interest rates through monetary easing was extended and intensified. To a great extent, the Obama years have been the Bush years extended to their logical conclusion. Whether Bush would have gone for the stimulus package is not clear, but it is conceivable that he would have.

Obama essentially pursued the Bush strategy of stabilizing the banks in the belief that a stable banking system was indispensible and would in itself stimulate the economy by creating liquidity. Whether it did or it didn’t, the strategy created the beginnings of Obama’s political problem. He drew substantial support from populists on the left and suspicion from populists on the right. The latter, already hostile to Bush’s policies, coalesced into the Tea Party. But this was not Obama’s biggest problem. It was that his policies, which both seemed to favor the financial elite and were at odds with what Democratic populists believed the president stood for, weakened his support from the left. The division between what he actually said and what his supporters thought they heard him say began to widen. While the healthcare battle solidified his opposition among those who would oppose him anyway, his continuing response to the financial crisis both solidified opposition among Republicans and weakened support among Democrats.

A Foreign Policy Problem

This was coupled with his foreign policy problem. Among Democrats, the anti-war faction was a significant bloc. Most Democrats did not support Obama with anti-war reasons as their primary motivator, but enough did make this the priority issue that he could not win if he lost this bloc. This bloc believed two things. The first was that the war in Iraq was unjustified and harmful and the second was that it emerged from an administration that was singularly insensitive to the world at large and to the European alliance in particular. They supported Obama because they assumed not only that he would end wars — as well as stop torture and imprisonment without trial — but that he would also re-found American foreign policy on new principles.

Obama’s decision to dramatically increase forces in Afghanistan while merely modifying the Bush administration’s timeline for withdrawing from Iraq caused unease within the Democratic Party. But two steps that Bush took held his position. First, one of the first things Obama did after he became president was to reach out to the Europeans. It was expected that this would increase European support for U.S. foreign policy. The Europeans, of course, were enthusiastic about Obama, as the Noble Peace Prize showed. But while Obama believed that his willingness to listen to the Europeans meant they would be forthcoming with help, the Europeans believed that Obama would understand them better and not ask for help.

The relationship was no better under Obama than under Bush. It wasn’t personality or ideology that mattered. It was simply that Germany, as the prime example, had different interests than the United States. This was compounded by the differing views and approaches to the global financial crisis. Whereas the Americans were still interested in Afghanistan, the Europeans considered Afghanistan a much lower priority than the financial crisis. Thus, U.S.-European relations remained frozen.

Then Obama made his speech to the Islamic world in Cairo, where his supporters heard him trying to make amends for Bush’s actions and where many Muslims heard an unwillingness to break with Israel or end the wars. His supporters heard conciliation, the Islamic world heard inflexibility.

The European response to Obama the president as opposed to Obama the candidate running against George Bush slowly reverberated among his supporters. Not only had he failed to end the wars, he doubled down and surged forces into Afghanistan. And the continued hostility toward the United States from the Islamic world reverberated among those on the Democratic left who were concerned with such matters. Add to that the failure to close Guantanamo and a range of other issues concerning the war on terror and support for Obama crumbled.

A Domestic Policy Focus

His primary victory, health-care reform, was the foundation of an edifice that was never built. Indeed, the reform bill is caught in the courts, and its future is as uncertain as it was when the bill was caught in Congress. The Republicans, as expected, agree on nothing other than Obama’s defeat. The Democrats will support him; the question is how enthusiastic that support will be.

Obama’s support now stands at 41 percent. The failure point for a president’s second term lurks around 35 percent. It is hard to come back from there. Obama is not there yet. The loss of another six points would come from his Democratic base (which is why 35 is the failure point; when you lose a chunk of your own base, you are in deep trouble). At this point, however, the president is far less interested in foreign policy than he is in holding his base together and retaking the middle. He did not win by a large enough margin to be able to lose any of his core constituencies. He may hope that his Republican challenger will alienate the center, but he can’t count on that. He has to capture his center and hold his left.

That means he must first focus on domestic policy. That is where the public is focused. Even the Afghan war and the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq are not touching nerves in the center. His problem is twofold. First, it is not clear that he can get anything past Congress. He can then argue that this is Congress’ fault, but the Republicans can run against Congress as well. Second, it is not clear what he would propose. The Republican right can’t be redeemed, but what can Obama propose that will please the Democratic core and hold the center? The Democratic core wants taxes. The center doesn’t oppose taxes (it is merely uneasy about them), but it is extremely sensitive about having the taxes eaten up by new spending — something the Democratic left supports. Obama is trapped between two groups he must have that view the world differently enough that bridging the gap is impossible.

The founders gave the United States a government that, no matter how large it gets, can’t act on domestic policy without a powerful consensus. Today there is none, and therefore there can’t be action. Foreign policy isn’t currently resonating with the American public, so any daring initiatives in that arena will likely fail to achieve the desired domestic political end. Obama has to hold together a coalition that is inherently fragmented by many different understandings of what his presidency is about. This coalition has weakened substantially. Obama’s attention must be on holding it together. He cannot resurrect the foreign policy part of it at this point. He must bet on the fact that the coalition has nowhere else to go. What he must focus on is domestic policy crafted to hold his base and center together long enough to win the election.

The world, therefore, is facing at least 14 months with the United States being at best reactive and at worst non-responsive to events. Obama has never been a foreign policy president; events and proclivity (I suspect) have always drawn him to domestic matters. But between now and the election, the political configuration of the United States and the dynamics of his presidency will force him away from foreign policy.

This at a time when the Persian Gulf is coming to terms with the  U.S. withdrawal from Iraq and the power of Iran, when  Palestinians and Israelis are facing another crisis over U.N. recognition, when the future of Europe is unknown, when North Africa is unstable and Syria is in crisis and when U.S. forces continue to fight in Afghanistan. All of this creates opportunities for countries to build realities that may not be in the best interests of the United States in the long run. There is a period of at least 14 months for regional powers to act with confidence without being too concerned about the United States.

The point of this analysis is to try to show the dynamics that have led the United States to this position, and to sketch the international landscape in broad strokes. The U.S. president will not be deeply engaged in the world for more than a year. Thus, he will have to cope with events pressed on him. He may undertake initiatives, such as trying to revive the Middle East peace process, but such moves would have large political components that would make it difficult to cope with realities on the ground. The rest of the world knows this, of course. The question is whether and how they take advantage of it.

Reprinting or republication of this report on websites is authorized by prominently displaying the following sentence, including the hyperlink to STRATFOR, at the beginning or end of the report.

Obama’s Dilemma: U.S. Foreign Policy and Electoral Realities is republished with permission of STRATFOR.”

Read more: Obama’s Dilemma: U.S. Foreign Policy and Electoral Realities | STRATFOR


A Formal Funeral for the Two-State Solution

By Ali Abunimah

September 19, 2011 „Foreign Affairs” – – The Palestinian Authority‘s bid to the United Nations for Palestinian statehood is, at least in theory, supposed to circumvent the failed peace process. But in two crucial respects, the ill-conceived gambit actually makes things worse, amplifying the flaws of the process it seeks to replace. First, it excludes the Palestinian people from the decision-making process. And second, it entirely disconnects the discourse about statehood from reality.

Most discussions of the UN bid pit Israel and the United States on one side, fiercely opposing it, and Palestinian officials and allied governments on the other. But this simplistic portrayal ignores the fact that among the Palestinian people themselves there is precious little support for the effort. The opposition, and there is a great deal of it, stems from three main sources: the vague bid could lead to unintended consequences; pursuing statehood above all else endangers equality and refugee rights; and there is no democratic mandate for the Palestinian Authority to act on behalf of Palestinians or to gamble with their rights and future.

Underscoring the lack of public support, numerous Palestinian civil society organizations and grassroots leaders, academics, and activists have been loudly criticizing the strategy. The Boycott National Committee (BNC) – the steering group of the global Palestinian-led campaign for boycott, divestment, and sanctions against Israel that has been endorsed by almost 200 Palestinian organizations – warned in August that the UN bid could end up sidelining the PLO as the official representative of all Palestinians and in turn disenfranchise Palestinians inside Israel and the refugees in the diaspora. A widely disseminated legal opinion by the Oxford scholar Guy Goodwin-Gill underscored the point, arguing that the PLO could be displaced from the UN by a toothless and illusory „State of Palestine” that would, at most, nominally represent only Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Others, such as the Palestinian Youth Movement – an international coalition of young Palestinians – declared that it stood „steadfastly against” the UN bid because it could jeopardize „the rights and aspirations of over two-thirds of the Palestinian people who live as refugees in countries of refuge and in exile, to return to their original homes.” Many, like the PYM, fear that unilaterally declaring a state along 1967 borders without any other guarantees of Palestinian rights would effectively cede the 78 percent of historic Palestine captured in 1948 to Israel and would keep refugees from returning to what would then be recognized de facto as an ethnically „Jewish state.”

Of course, there may be no clearer evidence of the distance between the UN bid and the actual will of the Palestinians than the secrecy of the process. Today, just days before the application is filed with the UN, the Palestinian public remains in the dark about exactly what the PA is proposing. No draft text has been shared with the Palestinian people. Instead the text is being negotiated with the Palestinian Authority’s donors as if they, not the Palestinian people, are its true constituency.

More fundamentally, though, the entire discussion of statehood ignores the facts on the ground. For starters, the PA fails the traditional criteria for statehood laid out in the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States: it controls neither territory nor external borders (except for the tiny enclaves it polices under the supervision of Israeli occupation forces). It is prohibited under the 1993 Oslo Accords from freely entering into relations with other states. As for possessing a permanent population, the majority of the Palestinian people are prohibited by Israel from entering the area on which the PA purports to claim statehood solely because they are not Jews (under Israel’s discriminatory Law of Return, Jews from anywhere in the world can settle virtually anywhere in Israel or the occupied territories, while native-born Palestinian refugees and their children are excluded). The PA cannot issue passports or identity documents; Israeli authorities control the population registry. No matter how the UN votes, Israel will continue to build settlements in the West Bank and maintain its siege of Gaza. As all this suggests, any discussion of real sovereignty is a fantasy.

Nor is the strategy likely to produce even formal UN membership or recognition. That would require approval by the Security Council, which the Obama administration has vowed to veto. The alternative is some sort of symbolic resolution in the UN General Assembly upgrading the status of the existing Palestinian UN observer mission – a decision with little practical effect. Such an outcome will hardly be worth all the energy and fuss, especially when there are other measures that the UN could take that would have much greater impact. For example, Palestinians would be better off asking for strict enforcement of existing but long ignored Security Council resolutions, such as Resolution 465, which was passed in 1980 and calls on Israel to „dismantle the existing settlements” in the occupied territories and determines that all Israel’s measures „to change the physical character, demographic composition, institutional structure or status of the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem, or any part thereof, have no legal validity” and are flagrant violations of international law.

Ultimately, any successful strategy should focus not on statehood but on rights. In its statement on the UN bid, the BNC emphasized that regardless of what happens in September, the global solidarity struggle must continue until Israel respects Palestinian rights and obeys international law in three specific ways: ending the occupation of Arab lands that began in 1967 and dismantling the West Bank wall that was ruled illegal in 2004 by the International Court of Justice; removing all forms of legal and social discrimination against Palestinian citizens of Israel and guaranteeing full equal rights; and offering full respect for Palestinian refugee rights, including the right of return. Palestinians and Israelis are not in a situation of equals negotiating an end to a dispute but are, respectively, colonized and colonizer, much as blacks and whites were in South Africa. This truth must be recognized, and pushing for such recognition would resonate far more with the Palestinian public than empty statehood talk.

Indeed, such a strategy has worried Israel enough that it has enlisted the U.S. in the fight against what Israeli leaders term „delegitimization.” „Delegitimizers” are supposedly not seeking justice and full human and political rights for Palestinians, but rather seeking the collapse of Israel – much like East Germany or apartheid South Africa – through political and legal assaults. According to Israel and groups supporting it in the United States, virtually all Palestine solidarity activism, especially BDS, is „delegitimization.” Some Israelis, including even former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, have warned that fighting a movement calling for universal civil and political rights would only make Israel look more, not less, like an apartheid state, worsening its situation. But Israeli elites have come up with no plausible response to the reality that within a few short years – because of Palestinian population growth and Israeli settlement construction – a Jewish minority will be ruling over a disenfranchised and subordinated Palestinian majority in a country that cannot be partitioned.

The plans for truncated and circumscribed Palestinian statehood, which successive American and Israeli governments have been prepared to discuss, fall far short of minimal Palestinian demands and have no hope of being implemented (as the dramatic failure of the Obama administration’s peace effort in its first two years underscores). Even President Obama, in his speech to the Israeli lobbying group AIPAC last May, called the status quo „unsustainable.” But he offered no
new answers.

These, then, are the lines along which the battle for the future of Palestine are going to be fought, no matter how many U.S. envoys head to Ramallah and Jerusalem to try to revive negotiations in which no one believes. Meanwhile, the UN bid should be seen not as the means to give birth to the Palestinian state but as the formal funeral of the two-state solution and the peace process that was supposed to bring it about.

ALI ABUNIMAH is the author of One Country: A Bold Proposal to End the Israeli-Palestinian Impasse. He co-founded theElectronic Intifada and is a policy adviser to Al-Shabaka, the Palestinian Policy Network


The Crisis of Europe and European Nationalism

By George Friedman

When I visited Europe in 2008 and before, the idea that Europe was not going to emerge as one united political entity was regarded as heresy by many leaders. The European enterprise was seen as a work in progress moving inevitably toward unification — a group of nations committed to a common fate. What was a core vision in 2008 is now gone. What was inconceivable — the primacy of the traditional nation-state — is now commonly discussed, and steps to devolve Europe in part or in whole (such as ejecting Greece from the eurozone) are being contemplated. This is not a trivial event.

Before 1492, Europe was a backwater of small nationalities struggling over a relatively small piece of cold, rainy land. But one technological change made Europe the center of the international system: deep-water navigation.

The ability to engage in long-range shipping safely allowed businesses on the Continent’s various navigable rivers to interact easily with each other, magnifying the rivers’ capital-generation capacity. Deep-water navigation also allowed many of the European nations to conquer vast extra-European empires. And the close proximity of those nations combined with ever more wealth allowed for technological innovation and advancement at a pace theretofore unheard of anywhere on the planet. As a whole, Europe became very rich, became engaged in very far-flung empire-building that redefined the human condition and became very good at making war. In short order, Europe went from being a cultural and economic backwater to being the engine of the world.

At home, Europe’s growing economic development was exceeded only by the growing ferocity of its conflicts. Abroad, Europe had achieved the ability to apply military force to achieve economic aims — and vice versa. The brutal exploitation of wealth from some places (South America in particular) and the thorough subjugation and imposed trading systems in others (East and South Asia in particular) created the foundation of the modern order. Such alternations of traditional systems increased the wealth of Europe dramatically.

But “engine” does not mean “united,” and Europe’s wealth was not spread evenly. Whichever country was benefitting had a decided advantage in that it had greater resources to devote to military power and could incentivize other countries to ally with it. The result ought to have been that the leading global empire would unite Europe under its flag. It never happened, although it was attempted repeatedly. Europe remained divided and at war with itself at the same time it was dominating and reshaping the world.

The reasons for this paradox are complex. For me, the key has always been the English Channel. Domination of Europe requires a massive land force. Domination of the world requires a navy heavily oriented toward maritime trade. No European power was optimized to cross the channel, defeat England and force it into Europe. The Spanish Armada, the French navy at Trafalgar and the Luftwaffe over Britain all failed to create the conditions for invasion and subjugation. Whatever happened in continental Europe, the English remained an independent force with a powerful navy of its own, able to manipulate the balance of power in Europe to keep European powers focused on each other and not on England (most of the time). And after the defeat of Napoleon, the Royal Navy created the most powerful empire Europe had seen, but it could not, by itself, dominate the Continent. (Other European geographic features obviously make unification of Europe difficult, but all of them have, at one point or another, been overcome. Except for the channel.)


Underlying Tensions


The tensions underlying Europe were bought to a head by German unification in 1871 and the need to accommodate Germany in the European system, of which Germany was both an integral and indigestible part. The result was two catastrophic general wars in Europe that began in 1914 and ended in 1945 with the occupation of Europe by the United States and the Soviet Union and the collapse of the European imperial system. Its economy shattered and its public plunged into a crisis of morale and a lack of confidence in the elites, Europe had neither the interest in nor appetite for empire.

Europe was exhausted not only by war but also by the internal psychosis of two of its major components. Hitler’s Germany and Stalin’s Soviet Union might well have externally behaved according to predictable laws of geopolitics. Internally, these two countries went mad, slaughtering both their own citizens and citizens of countries they occupied for reasons that were barely comprehensible, let alone rationally explicable. From my point of view, the pressure and slaughter inflicted by two world wars on both countries created a collective mental breakdown.

I realize this is a woefully inadequate answer. But consider Europe after World War II. First, it had gone through about 450 years of global adventure and increasingly murderous wars, in the end squandering everything it had won. Internally, Europe watched a country like Germany — in some ways the highest expression of European civilization — plunge to levels of unprecedented barbarism. Finally, Europe saw the United States move from the edges of history to assume the role of an occupying force. The United States became the envy of the Europeans: stable, wealthy, unified and able to impose its economic, political and military will on major powers on a different continent. (The Russians were part of Europe and could be explained within the European paradigm. So while the Europeans may have disdained the Russians, the Russians were still viewed as poor cousins, part of the family playing by more or less European rules.) New and unprecedented, the United States towered over Europe, which went from dominance to psychosis to military, political and cultural subjugation in a twinkling of history’s eye.

Paradoxically, it was the United States that gave the first shape to Europe’s future, beginning with Western Europe. World War II’s outcome brought the United States and Soviet Union to the center of Germany, dividing it. A new war was possible, and the reality and risks of the Cold War were obvious. The United States needed a united Western Europe to contain the Soviets. It created NATO to integrate Europe and the United States politically and militarily. This created the principle of transnational organizations integrating Europe. The United States also encouraged economic cooperation both within Europe and between North America and Europe — in stark contrast to the mercantilist imperiums of recent history — giving rise to the European Union’s precursors. Over the decades of the Cold War, the Europeans committed themselves to a transnational project to create a united Europe of some sort in a way not fully defined.

There were two reasons for this thrust for unification. The first was the Cold War and collective defense. But the deeper reason was a hope for a European resurrection from the horrors of the 20th century. It was understood that German unification in 1871 created the conflicts and that the division of Germany in 1945 re-stabilized Europe. At the same time, Europe did not want to remain occupied or caught in an ongoing near-war situation. The Europeans were searching for a way to overcome their history.

One problem was the status of Germany. The deeper problem was nationalism. Not only had Europe failed to unite under a single flag via conquest but also World War I had shattered the major empires, creating a series of smaller states that had been fighting to be free. The argument was that it was nationalism, and not just German nationalism, that had created the 20th century. Europe’s task was therefore to overcome nationalism and create a structure in which Europe united and retained unique nations as cultural phenomena and not political or economic entities. At the same time, by embedding Germany in this process, the German problem would be solved as well.


A Means of Redemption


The European Union was designed not simply to be a useful economic tool but also to be a means of European redemption. The focus on economics was essential. It did not want to be a military alliance, since such alliances were the foundation of Europe’s tragedy. By focusing on economic matters while allowing military affairs to be linked to NATO and the United States, and by not creating a meaningful joint-European force, the Europeans avoided the part of their history that terrified them while pursuing the part that enticed them: economic prosperity. The idea was that free trade regulated by a central bureaucracy would suppress nationalism and create prosperity without abolishing national identity. The common currency — the euro — is the ultimate expression of this hope. The Europeans hoped that the existence of some Pan-European structure could grant wealth without surrendering the core of what it means to be French or Dutch or Italian.

Yet even during the post-World War II era of security and prosperity, some Europeans recoiled from the idea of a transfer of sovereignty. The consensus that many in the long line of supporters of European unification believed existed simply didn’t. And today’s euro crisis is the first serious crisis that Europe has faced in the years since, with nationalism beginning to re-emerge in full force.

In the end, Germans are Germans and Greeks are Greeks. Germany and Greece are different countries in different places with different value systems and interests. The idea of sacrificing for each other is a dubious concept. The idea of sacrificing for the European Union is a meaningless concept. The European Union has no moral claim on Europe beyond promising prosperity and offering a path to avoid conflict. These are not insignificant goals, but when the prosperity stops, a large part of the justification evaporates and the aversion to conflict (at least political discord) begins to dissolve.

Germany and Greece each have explanations for why the other is responsible for what has happened. For the Germans, it was the irresponsibility of the Greek government in buying political power with money it didn’t have to the point of falsifying economic data to obtain eurozone membership. For the Greeks, the problem is the hijacking of Europe by the Germans. Germany controls the eurozone’s monetary policy and has built a regulatory system that provides unfair privileges, so the Greeks believe, for Germany’s exports, economic structure and financial system. Each nation believes the other is taking advantage of the situation.

Political leaders are seeking accommodation, but their ability to accommodate each other is increasingly limited by public opinion growing more hostile not only to the particulars of the deal but to the principle of accommodation. The most important issue is not that Germany and Greece disagree (although they do, strongly) but that their publics are increasingly viewing each other as nationals of a foreign power who are pursuing their own selfish interests. Both sides say they want “more Europe,” but only if “more Europe” means more of what they want from the other.


Managing Sacrifice


Nationalism is the belief that your fate is bound up with your nation and your fellow citizens and you have an indifference to the fate of others. What the Europeanists tried to do was create institutions that made choosing between your own and others unnecessary. But they did this not with martial spirit or European myth, which horrified them. They made the argument prudently: You will like Europe because it will be prosperous, and with all of Europe prosperous there will be no need to choose between your nation and other nations. Their greatest claim was that Europe would not require sacrifice. To a people who lived through the 20th century, the absence of sacrifice was enormously seductive.

But, of course, prosperity comes and goes, and as it goes sacrifice is needed. And sacrifice — like wealth — is always unevenly distributed. That uneven distribution is determined not only by necessity but also by those who have power and control over institutions. From a national point of view, it is Germany and France that have the power, with the British happy to be out of the main fray. The weak are the rest of Europe, those who surrendered core sovereignty to the Germans and French and now face the burdens of managing sacrifice.

In the end, Europe will remain an enormously prosperous place. The net worth of Europe — its economic base, its intellectual capital, its organizational capabilities — is stunning. Those qualities do not evaporate. But crisis reshapes how they are managed, operated and distributed. This is now in question. Obviously, the future of the euro is now widely discussed. So the future of the free-trade zone will come to the fore. Germany is a massive economy by itself, exporting more per year than the gross domestic products of most of the world’s other nation-states. Does Greece or Portugal really want to give Germany a blank check to export what it wants with it, or would they prefer managed trade under their control? Play this forward past the euro crisis and the foundations of a unified Europe become questionable.

This is the stuff that banks and politicians need to worry about. The deeper worry is nationalism. European nationalism has always had a deeper engine than simply love of one’s own. It is also rooted in resentment of others. Europe is not necessarily unique in this, but it has experienced some of the greatest catastrophes in history because of it. Historically, the Europeans have hated well. We are very early in the process of accumulating grievances and remembering how to hate, but we have entered the process. How this is played out, how the politicians, financiers and media interpret these grievances, will have great implications for Europe. Out of it may come a broader sense of national betrayal, which was just what the European Union was supposed to prevent.

Reprinting or republication of this report on websites is authorized by prominently displaying the following sentence, including the hyperlink to STRATFOR, at the beginning or end of the report.

The Crisis of Europe and European Nationalism is republished with permission of STRATFOR.”

Read more: The Crisis of Europe and European Nationalism | STRATFOR

Military unity could make EU a superpower: Kaczynski

KRYNICA, September 9, 2011 (AFP) – The creation of a united armed forces for the European Union could give Brussels superpower status to match that of Washington, Poland‘s opposition leader Jaroslaw Kaczynski told AFP Friday.

„I want Europe to be a superpower,” Kaczynski said in an interview at the Krynica Economic Forum in southern Poland, while on the campaign trail ahead of a general election on October 9.”I’m a eurorealist and I support a stronger Europe, especially in the political-military aspect,” Kaczynski added, in an apparent pre-election drive to ditch his eurosceptic image.

The 62-year-old identical twin of late Polish president Lech Kaczynski, who died in an April 2010 air crash in Russia, governed in tandem with him as prime minister in 2006-2007.

He gained a reputation as a strident eurosceptic after a string of rows with Brussels.

„A political centre which has at its disposal certain means vis-a-vis external forces would make Europe a real superpower and I would really want this,” Kaczynski said.

„Europe should have a political centre, but equipped with armed forces this political centre could be an equal partner for the United States and we must not forget China or India.”

Asked whether he supported military integration among EU states, Kaczynski replied: „Yes, but under the condition that it will be on the level of a very powerful army and not that we create some kind of corps or brigades or other such laughable initiatives.”

„No European state alone is capable of being a superpower – and so it’s clear – I mean Russia too. Nor are France and Germany together because they are just too small,” said the conservative opposition leader, known for his combative and mistrustful stance towards Moscow.

„Just look at the difference in how Russia views those who don’t have this kind of strength – here I mean the EU – and those who do have it, for example the US,” Kaczynski observed.

Turning to the economy, the opposition leader, who has long shunned Poland’s entry into the eurozone, slammed the 17-member single currency club for balking at input from candidate states in finding a cure to its debt woes.

„The creation of a two-speed Europe is paving the way towards the European Union plunging into another crisis and to this we say an emphatic No!,” Kaczynski fumed.

In a rare show of solidarity with the centrist government of Prime Minister Donald Tusk, Kaczynski derided as „disrespectful” Brussels’ exclusion of Poland as current EU president from eurozone crisis talks.

„We’re not happy about that, even though they are our political rivals,” he said, adding that he saw Poland’s eurozone entry nowhere on the horizon.

„We’ve been very careful and now with the crisis we are even more careful. It’s my opinion that we can’t give any realistic target date whatsoever,” he stressed.

Under its 2004 EU entry deal, Warsaw is obliged to adopt the single European currency but has no fixed deadline to do so.

In light of the crisis, Poland has said it will meet Maastricht Treaty criteria for eurozone entry by 2015 but has refused to set any target entry date.

His right-wing Law and Justice (PiS) party scored a weak 29 percent voter popularity compared to 46 percent support for the centrist Civic Platform (PO) of Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, according to an opinion poll published this week by the independent Warsaw-based TSN OBOP pollsters.


Poland, which holds the EU’s rotating presidency, joined NATO in 1999 and the EU five years later, after being the first Soviet-bloc state to negotiate a bloodless end to communism in 1989.

9/11 gave US a chance to achieve goals in region

KABUL (PAN): Some political analysts say the 2001 US invasion of Afghanistan was aimed at protecting and promoting its interests in the region, not defeating Al Qaeda and Taliban.

Nearly 3,000 people were killed and many others wounded when four hijacked passenger planes were crashed into the World Trade Center and one into the Pentagon on Sept. 11, 2001.

Adviser to the Finance Ministry, Najeeb Manli, said the US had come to Afghanistan in its own interest. He said if the US was able to achieve its goals, it would abandon Afghanistan without caring for its people and international concerns.

„The US has no plan to eliminate Al Qaeda and Taliban, liberate Afghanistan or establish a democracy here,” he said. Afghanistan’s crucial geographical location makes it strategically important to the US. Manli said it was the time for Afghans to take advantage of the situation.

The observer thought the proposed strategic cooperation deal with the US was in the interest of both countries. He said if Afghanistan wanted to safeguard its sovereignty, it needed a strong partner. He called training and equipping Afghan forces by the US a historic opportunity the country had never availed in the past.

The ongoing conflict was a legacy of mismanagement and a non-serious approach on the part of the US, he added. In order to reduce casualties among US troops, the country in initials days of the war hired warlords, causing the situation to slip out of control.

Another political analyst, Ahmad Saeedi, described Sept. 11 a terrible incident that jolted the US out of its slumber and conveyed the message that terrorism knew no borders.

Saeedi said the US plan was not only to crush its opponents and bring peace to Afghanistan, but to use Afghan soil for achieving its goals in the region. The attacks provided a chance to the US to give practical shape to its strategic designs.

According to him, the US initially thought it would be able to easily achieve its targets by ousting the Taliban regime. But it confronted many challenges, including interference from Pakistan and Iran, he said. Insufficient knowledge of the Afghan culture added to American woes, he pointed out.

„The US is still in control of the war. The country wants to fight the war in an organised way to achieve its long-term objectives,” he said.

Though peace in Afghanistan is in the interest of the US, yet the war is necessary to continue, he said. „The war is not a big issue for the US, which eyes future economic control over the entire region.”

The US objectives in the region include „access to untapped natural resources in Afghanistan and Central Asian countries and control over other regional countries. He saw the US as an occupying force attacking any country it considers a threat to peace.
Human rights activist Kabir Ranjbar said the US invaded Afghanistan to seek revenge on Al Qaeda. „There is no visible shift in the US aims, but it has been unable to achieve anything worthwhile, except killing Osama bin Laden. In my view, Al Qaeda is still functional and even more strengthened.”

He said Afghanistan would not be able to develop until „criminals” were in rule at central, provincial, district and village levels

Muhammad Ameen Wakman, professor of political science at Kabul University, said the US had planned to come to the region before 9/11. It sought to monitor Central Asian states and contain the Chinese and Iranian influence.

He opined the US would not leave Afghanistan even after 2014, when the security transition process from foreign troops to local forces is scheduled to be complete.


NATO’s Finest Hour The day the Alliance stood up for America.

he shock and horror of 9/11 is burned into all our memories. I was on an aircraft over the Atlantic that day, flying back to Washington from Brussels, when the pilot gave us the awful news and turned the plane back. I well remember the terrible feeling I had, as many people around the world did at that moment—that I could have been on one of those planes, or that I could have been in one of those buildings. None of us was safe anymore.

Yesterday we all remembered that day 10 years ago, when terrorists turned airplanes into weapons of mass destruction. But we should also remember what happened the following day. Sept. 12, 2001, the North Atlantic Council, the NATO Alliance’s governing body, met in special session. For the first time since NATO’s founding in 1949, the council decided unanimously to invoke Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, saying that the attack on 9/11 was not just an attack on the United States, but an attack on all the members of NATO.

Within hours of this historic meeting, NATO’s Airborne Warning and Control System aircraft were alerted for deployment in the skies over America. They patrolled our vast airspace for the next five months.

The invocation of Article 5 was a defining moment for NATO. Until that moment, everyone had assumed that this commitment of the treaty was designed to involve the U.S. in the defense of Europe. No one imagined that it would first be used to bring Europe to the defense of the U.S. But with this one act, NATO signaled a fundamental change in its mission. All of us now recognized that security in Europe and in the U.S. was inextricably connected to events far beyond NATO’s traditional areas of operation. NATO had to stop thinking regionally and begin thinking globally.

Getty ImagesGerman soldiers relinquish control of security in Mazar-e-Sharif, capital of Balkh province, to the Afghan government, July 23.

Today, five of NATO’s six current operations are outside of the alliance’s territory. NATO’s soldiers are fighting in the very territories of Afghanistan where the 9/11 terrorists trained and planned their heinous attacks. NATO ships are taking part in an anti-piracy mission in the Indian Ocean, and NATO forces are training Iraqi soldiers, stabilizing the situation in Kosovo, and still protecting Libyan civilians against the remnants of the regime that had tried to suppress their freedom.

To respond to the evolving security environment following 9/11, the leaders of NATO countries agreed in Lisbon last year on a new Strategic Concept for the alliance. NATO reaffirmed the centrality of collective defense and made clear that today’s threats to alliance territory are more likely to come atop a long-range missile, over the internet or from suicide bombers than from armies marching across borders. It also made clear that real security in an era of global threats and challenges requires NATO to work in close cooperation with the widest possible range of partners—both near and far.

The new Strategic Concept laid the foundation for a series of decisions, from employing cyber defenses and deploying territorial missile defenses, to deepening NATO’s partnership with Russia and strengthening our relationships with countries such as Australia and Japan, which share our values.

Next May, the leaders of NATO will meet in Chicago to review and update our strategy, and to see how we can meet our security challenges in this time of economic austerity.

Ten years after 9/11, NATO remains the most powerful and successful military alliance in history. Our strength comes from our shared values, our ability to adapt to changing threats, and most of all, from our commitment to collective security. On Sept. 12, 2001, NATO made clear in words and deeds that an attack against one is an attack against all. That is why, today and for the past 62 years, NATO is, as President Obama said, an alliance that „remains the cornerstone of our engagement with the world, and a catalyst for global cooperation.”

Mr. Daalder is the U.S. ambassador to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.


10 ani de MINCIUNI, FAPTE, URMARI, REEDUCARE. Ce manipulari se folosesc pentru a legitima declansarea unui razboi?

Mass-media vuieste deja, inca inainte sa se fi implinit sorocul, pe marginea temei “atentatele de la 11 septembrie 2001″. Un enunt stereotip insoteste materialele dedicate acestui subiect:atentatele care au schimbat lumea.Americanii, conform ultimului sondaj, ar considera ca atentatele au influentat lumea chiar mai mult decat prabusirea comunismului(!). Adevarul este ca au schimbat lumea: au reprezentatpretextul…

– invadarii si declansarii razboaielor din Afganistan si Irak,

– emiterii unor masuri legislative si institutionale de supraveghere orwelliana a populatiei civile: Patriot Act, acte de identitate biometrice, sisteme centralizate de baze de date interoperabile, sisteme de supraveghere video, de ascultare a telefoanelor si de interceptare a mailurilor, etc.

– folosirii oficiale a torturii fata de prizonierii considerati teroristi si a unor experimente sadice in inchisorile americane din tarile ocupate (de genul Abu Ghraib) etc.

Propagandistic, cu tot esecul razboaielor pomenite si al tot mai multelor informatii care contrazic flagrant versiunea oficiala asupra atentatelor, pare ca “razboiul”… pentru inspaimantarea populatiei cu terorismul a fost castigat. Cel putin daca ne luam dupa sondaje, atat pe plan american sau european, oamenii aproba in continuare masurile coercitive de tip Big-Brother pentru combaterea “terorismului”.

Dupa 10 ani, filmul ar avea nevoie de un remake. S-au descotorosit de Osama bin Laden, l-au zburat pe Gaddafi din corturile de lider al Libiei si au “asistat” la (=orchestrat) o serie de revolte din tarile arabe. Semn ca, cel mai probabil, “filmul” razboiului impotriva terorismului trebuie sa intre intr-o noua etapa. Sau sa fie identificata o noua tinta, candidat cu cele mai mari sanse de calificare fiind Iranul. Mai ales ca asteptarea publicului consumator chiar asta este: 75% dintre intervievati au declarat ca este “cel putin probabil” ca un alt atac “care va provoca un mare numar de pierderi de vieti omenesti in America” sa aiba loc in viitorul apropiat/ 24% dintre intervievati au spus ca “e foarte probabil” ca un nou atac va avea loc curand.

Intre timp, oferta s-a diversificat. Alaturi de teroristul musulman si-a mai facut aparitia un personaj negativ exponential: teroristul alb, “crestin” si extremist sau/si “conservator”. Si, alaturi de metoda “clasica” a terorismului prin violenta armata a aparut si… terorismul alimentar sau biologic.

Redam mai jos cateva lucruri mai putin stiute despre evenimentele din 11 septembrie si trecem in revista cateva cazuri de mega-inscenari din istoria recenta destinate justificarii declansarii razboiului.

In ruinele celor doua turnuri gemene, prabusite in urma cu 10 ani, a fost gasit un pasaport apartinand unui arab, Satam Al Suqami. Aceasta descoperire a pus autoritatile americane pe urmele atentatorilor. La Pentagon, printre ramasite materiale, si-a facut aparitia un alt act de identitate.Perfect intact. Metalele au fost vaporizate, cutiile negre ale avioanelor nu au fost gasite, insa documentele unor membri ai “Al Queda” nu au ars.

La catva timp dupa ce Turnurile Gemene s-au prabusit, o alta cladire din apropiere, WTC 7, s-a facut una cu pamantul, desi nu a fost lovita de niciun avion. “Autorul moral” al atentatelor, Osama bin Landen, a fost ucis de trupele americane, dar trupul sau nu a putut fi aratat pentru ca a fost aruncat in mare. Asa, ca din senin. Nu este teoria conspiratiei, ci varianta oficiala difuzata de autoritatile americane.

La putin timp de la eveniment, presedintele SUA George W. Bush avertiza populatia sa nu se increada in teoriile conspiratiei, desi explicatia aprobata era de un conspirationism pur: un grup de teroristi islamici fara instructie militara doboara sistemul de securitate al celui mai puternic stat din istorie si pun jos in cateva ore simbolurile sale.

La 10 ani de la eveniment, odata cu explozia internetului, povestea guvernului american incepe sa-si piarda tot mai mult din credibilitate. Stirile alternative sunt puse cap la cap, iar oamenii isi pot face o parere mai clara despre ce s-a intamplat. Chiar daca nu exista o teorie unificata, este relevant ca interpretarea musulmana cade, pe zi ce trece, in ridicol. Multe informatii contradictorii provin chiar din media traditionala. BBC a publicat o stire ce dezvaluia ca mai multi “atacatori” traiesc bine mersi deoarece, pur si simplu, nu au fost in avioanele deturnate. La catva timp, un documentar al aceluiasi post de televiziune dezvaluia ca Al-Qaeda, organizatia considerata responsabila de masacru, are o existenta fictiva, fiind practic incapabila de a pune in aplicare un asemenea plan. De asemenea, in istoria omenirii, singurele cladiri prabusite din cauza unui incendiu sunt cele doua turnuri gemene, desi au fost proiectate sa reziste la temperaturi de 1600 grade Celsius. Incendiul a atins 650 de grade C.

“Au fost construite sa reziste la aproape orice, incluzand uragane….bombe si la impactul cu un avion” (Hyman Brown, managerul responsabil de constructia turnurilor).

In alta ordine de idei, unul dintre membrii Comisiei de Ancheta asupra evenimentelor 9/11, declara ca “investigatia este compromisa. Este un scandal national. Dar Casa Alba vrea sa musamalizeze intreaga poveste”. Pe altii, Pentagonul nu a facut altceva decat sa-i puna pe niste piste false.  “I was shocked at how different the truth was from the way it was described….The tapes told a radically different story from what had been told to us and the public for two years….This is not spin. This is not true” [„Eram socat de cat de diferit era adevarul de modul in care era descris… Casetele spuneau o varianta radical diferita fata de ceea ce ni s-a spus public timp de 2 ani… Nu este adevarat.” – n.n.].

Insa suspiciunea privind evenimentele de la 11 Septembrie nu se margineste doar la membrii comisiei sau la conspirationisti lunatici. Senatori, fosti militari, membri ai serviciilor speciale, experti in arhitectura si constructii , oameni de stiinta, familiile celor decedati, magistrati, psihiatri, toti contesta povestea oficiala prezentata initial (…)

E prematur, cred, a incerca o identificare a responsabilor pentru evenimentele teribile de acum 10 ani. Dar niciodata nu e inutil a studia istoria si a vedea daca putem accepta pe cuvant de onoare teoriile fantastice oferite de guvernanti… Iar Operatiunea NorthwoodGolful TonkinAfacerea Lavon sugereaza ca mecanismele psihologice din spatele declansarii oricarui razboi sunt exploatate fara niciun fel de mila.

“The desired resultant from the execution of this plan would be to place the United States in the apparent position of suffering defensible grievances from a rash and irresponsible government of Cuba and to develop an international image of a Cuban threat to peace in the Western Hemisphere”

[„Rezultatul dorit al executiei acestui plan va fi de a pune SUA in pozitia aparenta de a suferi lovituri de la guvernul iresponsabil si nesabuit al Cubei, si de a dezvolta o imagine internationala a amenintarii pe care Cuba o aduce pacii in emisfera vestica.” – n.n.]

Operatiunea NorthwoodGolful TonkinAfacerea Lavon sunt tot atatea incidente auto-provocate pentru a servi, apoi, drept pretextpentru declansarea unor operatiuni mai vaste – razboi, interventii militare etc.

Operatiunea Northwood, care nu a ajuns sa fie pusa in aplicare, ar fi constat in efectuarea, de catre CIA, a unor acte teroriste pe teritoriul SUA care sa fi incriminat guvernul comunist cubanez si care, astfel, ar fi dat legitimitate in ochii opiniei publice americane si internationale pentru un atac militar asupra Cubei.

Incidentul de la Golful Tonkin, un conflict intre doua nave militare, a fost pretextul de care s-a folosit SUA pentru a incepe razboiul din Vietnam.

Despre afacerea Lavon aflam de aici:

Afacerea Lavon a demonstrat capacitatea Israelului de a se folosi de operatiuni teroriste pentru a atrage simpatia tarilor occidentale. In 1954, agenti israelieni au recurs la atacuri cu bombe in Egipt lasand in urma dovezi ce ii incriminau pe arabi.

S-a incercat astfel inscenarea lor pentru a sustine un climat de instabilitate in aceasta tara, ca apoi Marea Britanie sa fie fortata sa isi mentina trupele in peninsula Sinai, pentru a apara nou infiintatul stat israelian. (…)

Alte exemple:
Atacul de la Pearl Harbour: serviciile secrete americane si britanice ar fi stiut de intentia japonezilor de a ataca portul militar american. Nu s-au luat masuri pentru ca socul atacului sa fie resimtit puternic de opinia publica americana, pana atunci adepta neinterventiei in razboiul mondial si, astfel, Roosevelt sa aiba mana libera pentru intrarea in razboi.

Sa ne reamintim si articolul lui Jeff Riggenbach, CONSPIRATIA… IMPOTRIVA “TEORIEI” CONSPIRATIEI. Cui ii este frica de istorie si scepticism?

(…) Noi nu ştim care teorii ale conspiraţiei sunt adevărate şi care nu. În multe cazuri nici nu putem şti, pur şi simplu nu avem suficiente informaţii. De obicei, aflăm că o anumită teorie a conspiraţiei este adevărată, pentru că istoricii – fie că este vorba de istoricii grăbiţi care de obicei se numesc jurnalişti, fie de cei mai sârguincioşi care scriu cărţi şi predau la colegii şi universităţi – au venit şi au examinat terenul şi documentele şi au analizat mărturia tuturor martorilor pe care i-au găsit, ajungând astfel la concluzii pertinente. De obicei, istoria hotărăşte dacă o teorie a conspiraţiei este adevărată sau nu.

În general, oficialii guvernamentali nu sunt mulţumiţi de această stare a lucrurilor, deoareceistoria este inamicul natural al statului. O meditare ulterioară serioasă asupra ce anume a făcut această stare a lucrurilor şi de ce, tinde în mod inevitabil să submineze toată încrederea pe care am fi putut-o avea în motivele bune ale statului şi în dorinţa de a promova „bunăstarea socială”. Aceasta tinde în mod inevitabil să „trezească scepticismul opiniei publice cu privire la afirmaţiile guvernului” şi „să slăbească mobilizarea şi participarea populaţiei la eforturile depuse de guvern, sau ambele”.

Statul câştigă de pe urma lipsei de informaţii impuse de viteza de derulare a evenimentelor. (…)

Rothbard ne aminteşte că este important
ca statul să inculce în supuşii săi o aversiune faţă de orice „teorie a conspiraţiei din istorie”, deoarece căutarea „conspiraţiilor” înseamnă căutarea de motive şi o atribuire a responsabilităţii pentru faptele istorice reprobabile. Dacă totuşi o tiranie impusă de stat, sau o venalitate, sau un război agresiv, nu au fost cauzate de conducătorii statului, ci de „forţe sociale” misterioase şi obscure, sau de starea imperfectă a lumii, sau dacă într-un fel, toată lumea a fost responsabilă („toţi suntem criminali”, susţine o deviză), atunci nu are niciun rost ca lumea să se indigneze sau să se împotrivească unor astfel de fărădelegi. În plus, un atac asupra „teoriilor conspiraţiei” înseamnă căsupuşii vor deveni mai uşor de înşelat, încrezându-se în considerentele de „bunăstare generală” aduse întotdeauna de stat pentru a se angaja într-o acţiune despotică. O „teorie a conspiraţiei” poate tulbura sistemul, făcând opinia publică să se îndoiască de propaganda ideologică a statului.

Din când în când, desigur, un stat nu reuşeşte să ia toate măsurile de precauţie, sau să facă planuri pentru suficient timp înainte – nu reuşeşte să conspire destul de eficient. Acest lucru s-a întâmplat în Statele Unite după primul război mondial. Statul american şi-a avut istoricii de curte pe pozitie. Îi avusese pe poziţie deja de mai mulţi ani, dar nu a reuşit să anticipeze o mişcare revizionistă, care a prins rădăcini în anii 1920 în rândul celor mai informaţi şi pătrunzători istorici americani, în special Harry Elmer Barnes şi Charles Beard.

După cum îşi amintea Barnes evenimentele din acei ani după treizeci ani, la începutul anilor 1950, „Adaptarea relatărilor istorice la fapte istorice legate de cadrul şi cauzele primul război mondial – cunoscută în istorie sub numele de „Revizionism” – a fost cea mai importantă dezvoltare în istoriografie din deceniul 1920”.

De fapt, Barnes a scris:
„controversa revizionistă a fost aventura intelectuală remarcabilă în domeniul istoric din secolul XX, până la Pearl Harbor”.

Potrivit lui Barnes,
revizionismul, aplicat la primul război mondial, a arătat că fondul şi cauzele reale ale conflictului au fost foarte aproape de reversul imaginii prezentate în propaganda politică şi scrierile istorice despre deceniul războiului”.

Iar prin anii 1930,
„istoricii cât de cât receptivi la fapte au recunoscut că Revizionismul a câştigat uşor în conflictul cu doctrina din timpul războiului, acceptată anterior”.

De fapt, Barnes spune că „până în 1928 … aproape toata lumea, cu excepţia celor greu de ucis şi luptătorilor până la ultima suflare din profesia istorică, a ajuns să accepte Revizionismul, chiar şi publicul larg a început să gândească direct în premise”.

De fapt, revizioniştii au câştigat atât de mult un segment al marelui public cu opinia despre război, încâtadministraţia Roosevelt a trebuit să recurgă la măsuri disperate pentru a câştiga acordul populaţiei pentru planurile sale de a intra în al doilea război mondial de partea aliaţilor. (…)

Dar…  propaganda merge mai departe, iar populatia s-a lasat si se lasareeducata de catre propaganda spectaculoasa a terorii, fara sa clipeasca:

– Americanii pică de acord: spionarea cetăţenilor e bună, tortura – excelentă

–  Americanii cred ca atentatele din 2001 au avut un impact mai mare asupra SUA decat razboiul din Vietnam sau asasinarea lui JFK

–  Oficiali UE si NATO: Lumea e mai sigura la 10 ani dupa 11 septembrie 2001


– “OAMENII SUNT PREGATITI SA RENUNTE LA INTIMITATE DE DRAGUL SECURITATII” – referitor la scanerele corporale din aeroporturi

sursa: razbointrucuvant.ro